Famines in medieval Egypt: natural and man-made by Lev, Yaacov






Leidschrift, jaargang 28, nummer 2, september 2013 
The typology of famines in medieval Egypt is rather simple since famines 
occurred either as a result of speculative withholding of supplies, or as a 
result of the Nile not rising enough. As simple as this situation is, it 
determined what successive dynasties could or couldn’t do, and any 
assessment of such actions must be directly related to the type of shortage 
that occurred. Furthermore, one must emphasize that in the case of 
shortages caused by insufficient inundation of the Nile, the situation in the 
year that the Nile failed (‘the current year’) was determined by the rise of the 
river in the preceding year, which could have been quite normal. The 
knowledge about a shortage in the next year created a buyers’ market in ‘the 
current year’, leaving wide room for governmental intervention in both 
Cairo’s grain market and the bread supply system. When in the year 
following ‘the current year’ the full impact of grain shortage hit Cairo, the 
ability of the government to intervene and its efforts to alleviate the 
situation, if taken at all, were quite limited. 
This paper will discuss three cases of famine in medieval Egypt: two 
caused by insufficient rise of the Nile (in 1024-1025 and in 1200-1202) and 
one caused by withholding of supplies in ‘the current year’ (the famine of 
1263-1264). However, any discussion of these events must be preceded by a 




The Nile’s annual cycle 
 
The agricultural life of medieval Egypt was governed by the Nile and the 
Coptic calendar. The Nile’s annual rise used to begin during the month of 
Baʼunah (8 June-7 July) and intensified during Abib (8 July-6 August), and 
came first in Upper Egypt. The Nile usually reached plentitude, i.e. sixteen 
cubits (1 cubit = 46.2 cm) as measured at the Cairo Nilometer, during Misra 
(7 August-5 September), while the new agricultural year began during Tut 
(11/12 September-9/10 October). During Tut the seeds needed for the 
planting of wheat and barly were delivered to the peasants, but the actual 
sowing began in Upper Egypt during Babah (11/12 October-9/10 





December-8/9 January). The agricultural cycle ended shortly before the 
beginning of the new rise of the Nile in Baʼunah and was marked by the 
distinction between winter crops, which included basic foods such as grain 
and beans as well as flax, while watermelons and cash crops such as cotton 
and sugar cane were part of the summer crops.1 
 
 
Cairo’s grain market 
 
The grain market of Egypt’s capital city of Fustat-Cairo was influenced by 
two parallel events: the observation of the rise of the Nile and the arrival of 
freshly-harvested grain to the grain ports of the capital where it was taxed. 
The size of the grain crop was determined by the rise of the Nile in the 
previous year but the volume and intensity of demand for the freshly 
harvested grain was determined by the progress in the rise of the Nile in 
‘the current year’, which indicated the fortunes of the next agricultural year. 
Famines could occur in ‘the current year’ because of predictions of a bad 
harvest in the next year, which created a buyers’ market and drove the 
prices up beyond the reach of many.  
Furthermore, Cairo’s grain market was torn between the household 
grain economy of the dynastic court and the commercial urban grain market. 
In Cairo the regime stored grain and fodder and provided for the court, 
employees of the state, the army and navy and special institutions such as 
the Royal Guest House. The commercial urban market operated parallel to 
the regime’s household grain economy but was influenced by it. The court 
sold its surplus grain on the urban market but, in times of crisis, also 
diverted and confiscated grain shipments intended for the commercial 
urban market to its granaries.2 
 
                                                     
1 This section is based on late medieval agricultural calendars. These texts have 
been collected, translated into French and annotated by Charles Pellat: C. Pellat, 
Cinq calendriers Égyptiens (Cairo 1986). 
2 The basic distinction between the household grain economy of the regime and the 
commercial urban grain market has been put forward by: I.M. Lapidus, ‘The Grain 
Economy of Mamluk Egypt’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 12 
(1969) 1-15: 12-14, and is applicable for the Fatimid period too. See A. Maqrizi, 
Musawwadat Kitab al-Mawaʻiz wa-l-Iʻtibar fi Dhikr al-Khitat wa-l-Athar [English 
translation], A.F. Sayyid ed. (London 1995) 246-248. 




The famine of 1024-1025 
 
Our knowledge of the events of these two years derives from the surviving 
fragments of Musabbihi’s contemporary chronicle. 3  Musabbihi was an 
exceptional historian driven by curiosity and had access to official decrees 
and comprehensive knowledge of daily events in Fustat, where most of the 
population lived, derived perhaps from a kind of written document or log. 
His first record of the rise of the Nile is from Friday 11 Jumada II 414/30 
August 1023, and the height of the Nile was fourteen cubist and one finger. 
On that day the Coptic New Year was celebrated and the rise of the Nile 
took its normal course. On Thursday 13 Jumada II/2 September, the Cairo 
Canal (Khalij) was opened. However, on Sunday 23 Jumada II/12 
September, the Nile massively receded.4 It was an unprecedented event that 
brought people to perform public supplication prayers and had a 
devastating effect on the grain market as it drove the prices up, supply 
ceased and black markets emerged. The prices of bread also went up.5 
 It was a panic response driven by the inner logic and mechanism of 
the grain market. Up to that day everything went as normal: supply was 
regular (due to a good harvest determined by the rise of the Nile during the 
previous years) and wheat and bread were affordable. However, in 
anticipation of next year’s shortage, those who could afford it were buying 
more wheat than usual, or withholding sales from their stocks, which caused 
prices to go up. Eventually, those who had stocks stopped selling in order 
to protect themselves from the anticipated next year’s shortage. The rising 
prices of wheat also pushed up the price of bread, which was prepared and 
baked on a daily basis. In social terms it can be said that large purchases of 
wheat by the ‘haves’ (the urban upper class) drove prices up, affecting 
                                                     
3  Muhammad al-Musabbihi, Akhbar Misr [English trans.], A.F. Sayyid and Th. 
Bianquis eds. (Cairo 1978). 
4 For the geography of the Cairo Canal, see: G. Cornu, Atlas du monde arabo-islamique 
a lʼépoque classique (IXe-Xe siècles) (Leiden 1985) map X. For the opening of the Canal, 
its significance and the ceremonies associated with it, see: W. Popper, The Cairo 
Nilometer (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1951) 82-87; P. Sanders, Ritual, Politics, and the 
City in Fatimid Cairo (New York 1994) 100-112; H. Halm, Die Kalifen von Kairo. Die 
Fatimiden in Ägypten 973-1074 (Munich 2003) ch. 2, esp. 64-68, provides extensive 
discussion of the Nile’s geography and other aspects pertinent to the river’s flow 
and rise. 





immediately the urban poor and the low middle class, if such terms can be 
applied to medieval society. Another way to discuss the social consequences 
of the evolving famine is to employ the terms ‘structural poor’ (permanent 
poor) and ‘conjunctural poor’ (temporary poor). These terms are used 
frequently by historians of medieval and early modern Europe and were 
introduced into Middle Eastern studies by Mark R. Cohen.6 
The structural poor were the truly destitute who eked out a living on 
a daily basis. The conjunctural poor were people who usually lived on the 
verge of subsistence and consisted of a diversified range of social groups, 
including artisans and small shopkeepers. This class of people frequently 
fluctuated between poverty and subsistence and any rise in bread prices 
affected them immediately as it was their staple food, which they bought on 
a daily basis. We are completely in the dark about the wider social 
ramifications of the famine and the lot of other disadvantaged groups such 
as infants, orphans, widows and old age women. In the middle ages, the 
survival of infants was always precarious and any food crisis gravely 
jeopardized their existence and the same can said about the other groups.       
The regime’s response to the evolving crisis was restrained and 
focused on the replacement of the market supervisor (muhtasib).7 The new 
market supervisor, Yaʻqub ibn al-Dawwas, (appointed on Sunday 5 
Rajab/23 September) was entrusted with overall responsibility for the 
markets and grain ports of the capital. His first action was to punish the 
bread vendors and flour merchants by having them beaten. Musabbihi 
asserts that these steps brought about the renewal of bread supply and 
calmed people down. The effect of these punitive actions against the 
professional groups involved in the more narrow mechanism of bread 
production and supply was short lived. On Wednesday 8 Rajab/26 
September, the bread shortage intensified and further steps were taken to 
deal with the situation. The policy of punishing certain professional groups 
was extended to include the millers, who were ordered to assume 
responsibility for the supply of bread instead of the bread vendors. Further 
steps were also taken involving the forcible opening of grain stocks 
                                                     
6  See M.R. Cohen, Poverty and Charity in the Jewish Community of Medieval Egypt 
(Princeton 2005) and idem, The Voice of the Poor in the Middle Ages (Princeton 2005). 
7 There is considerable literature dealing with the supervision of markets (the hisba 
institution) and the market supervisor in medieval Islam. See, for example, A. 
Ghabin, Hisba, Arts, and Craft in Islam (Wiesbaden 2009) and K. Stilt, Islamic Law in 
Action (New York 2011).  




belonging to people of the ruling establishment and delivery of grain from 
the grain ports of the capital.8  
The actions aimed at increasing the supply of grain at the expense of 
the better-off players in the market proved effective and for eight months 
(i.e. Rajab 414 - Rabiʻ I 415) the wheat and bread markets functioned in 
orderly fashion. This statement must be qualified as it relies on and reflects 
the only source available to use. It can be argued that the text does not 
necessarily fully reflect the events of these eight months. Although such an 
argument is valid, no alternative account can be offered. We can conjecture 
that during all those months the market was a buyers’ market and, 
eventually, collapsed under the pressure of excessive demand for grain. 
Musabbihi reports on rising prices of grain and bread during Rabiʻ I 
415/August-September 1024 as the situation was getting more and more 
desperate. Due to a good harvest in the previous year grain continued to 
arrive at the capital but towards the end of Rabiʻ II/after mid-September, a 
shipment intended for the grain port of Fustat was diverted to one of the 
palaces. The regime was hoarding grain in preparation for the impending 
famine.9 
The rise of the Nile in 415/the Summer of 1024 was above the 
optimal level and the next agricultural year looked promising, but the 
current realities were harsh and the situation volatile. For some inexplicable 
reasons a new market inspector was appointed and his one day in office (4 
Rajab 415/11 September 1024) proved disastrous, as he announced 
maximum prices for both good quality white bread and ordinary bread. This 
decree brought the grain market and the sale of bread to a complete 
standstill. The regime’s immediate reaction was to restore Yaʻqub ibn al-
Dawwas to his post and he partially revoked the disastrous policy of his 
predecessor. He allowed the bread vendors to sell bread at market prices 
but imposed a maximum price for the bread baked and sold by oven 
owners. Musabbihi maintains that new price patterns emerged: top quality 
bread (samid) was sold at double the price of other types of bread.10 
                                                     
8 Musabbihi, Akhbar, 14, 15-16. 
9 Ibidem, 32, 39. 
10 Ibidem, 46-47, 48. For legal and theological thinking about the legality of setting 
maximum prices, see D. Gimaret, ‘Les theologiens musulmans devant la hausse des 
prix’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 22.3 (1979) 330-338:331-338. 
For types of bread, see P.B. Lewicka, Food and Foodways of Medieval Cairenes. Aspects of 





As fascinating and detailed as Musabbihi’s chronicle is, we must read 
between the lines. His accounts of the three months Rajab, Shaʻban and 
Ramadan 415/September-November 1024 depict a fully functioning regime 
and orderly society living its life under the long shadow of food shortage. 
Rarely in these accounts the gloomy situation of the masses (al-ʻamma) is 
reflected, especially that prices went up during Rajab/September and that 
shortage became more acute. In Shawwal/December the situation 
deteriorated and the grim presence of the famine suddenly comes to the 
fore of Musabbihi’s narrative and, except for the inner core of the ruling 
elite, no one was immune. People invited to the palace for the traditional 
feast of Breaking of the Ramadan – a wide privileged circle of the ruling 
class – looted food and sweets offered at the banquet. Outside the confines 
of the palace the prices of grain and bread continued to rise and the famine 
claimed its death toll. Musabbihi’s references to mortality caused by the 
famine are more implied than explicit. The first allusion appears in the 
account of the events of Dhu l-Qaʻda/December 1024 – January 1025, 
reporting that the caliph realized that many people were dead and their 
bodies buried without ritual washing and shrouds. He was quick to provide 
shrouds and money for their proper burial. Eventually, the famine comes to 
dominate Musabbihi’s writing.11 
The whole entry referring to Friday 13 Dhu l-Qaʻda/16 January 1025 
is devoted to the starved people who were reduced to eating grass, the death 
toll of the famine, and especially the dying of the poor. The caliph who 
crossed the town in a procession was confronted by shouting: ‘Hunger, oh 
Commander of the Faithful hunger. Neither your father nor your 
grandfather did such a thing to us. [We implore] God, He [is responsible for] 
our being (amr)’. The town was on the verge of an outburst of violence and 
Yaʻqub ibn al-Dawwas lost his grip on the situation. Despite all his 
experience and having handled affairs adequately so far, his deeds only 
aggravated the misery of the people. In mid-Dhu l-Qaʻda/January, he went 
to Fustat accompanied by military cohorts and sealed 150 grain stores and 
forbade the sale of any grain from them. The decree had a catastrophic 
effect and danger of violence lurked upon the town. A person in the service 
of the vizier disobeyed the order. He sold grain from his store at the price 
prevalent before the proclamation of the decree and there were buyers 
willing and able to buy at that price. The regime swiftly reacted by rebuking 
                                                     
11 Musabbihi, Akhbar, 52, 66-67, 71. 




the market supervisor for his deeds and accusing him of mishandling the 
situation. A few days later an edict announcing the cancellation of custom 
duties levied on grain at Fustat’s grain ports was published, but it proved 
too little too late to have any real impact on the situation. The punishment 
of the flour merchants by intense beating was also to no avail.12 
The edict announcing the lifting of the customs duties on grain 
reflects the entrenched division between the household grain economy of 
the regime and commercial urban market and the fact that the regime 
continued to collect grain taxes even during the famine. Actually, the 
household grain economy of the regime failed to provide adequate supply 
of grain for the army, especially the black infantry. This failure might reflect 
the vast expansion of the black infantry corps that took place during al-
Hakim’s reign (996-1021) and providing for these troops proved to be 
beyond the means of the regime. The black infantry stationed in military 
quarters outside the walls of the palace city of Cairo posed a danger to 
Fustat, forcing the regime to defend the population from being attacked by 
its own starved troops who went on a rampage. The failure of the regime 
was even worse: hunger encroached on the palace and some of those who 
depended directly on the regime such the slaves and servants of the palace 
complex starved. 13  At this point Musabbihi’s chronicle stops and the 
process of recovery from the demographic and economic repercussions of 
the famine remains largely unattested. 
 
 
The crisis of 1200-1202 
 
Our knowledge of the 1200-1202 crisis is derived from the account of the 
physician ʻAbd al-Latif al-Baghdadi (1162-1231) who, during those critical 
years, lived in Egypt.14 He provides both a description of the rise of the Nile 
and the human consequences of the famine but, unlike Musabbihi, he had 
no interest in the workings of the wheat and bread markets and, therefore, 
his account must be supplemented by other reports.  
The rise of the Nile in 596/1199-1200 was twelve cubits and twenty-
one fingers. The full meaning of these figures must be seen against the 
                                                     
12 Musabbihi, Akhbar, 72-73, 75-76. 
13 Ibidem, 81-82, 85, 86, 87, 88-89. 
14 ʻAbd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, Kitab al-Ifada wa-l-Iʻtibar [English translation], K.H. 





prevailing wisdom in medieval Egypt that sixteen cubits meant a good 
agricultural year and high tax income for the government, while at fourteen 
cubits a precarious balance between supply and demand was maintained. A 
rise of less than fourteen cubits meant acute shortage and famine. The 
famine of 1200 was caused by hoarding in preparation for the shortage in 
1201. A letter written in Alexandria between 26 September and 1 October 
1200 testifies to rising prices of wheat and massive purchases by people of 
means. At such times the conduct of the ruler is critical and medieval 
historians described the Ayyubid sultan al-Malik al-ʻAdil in a favorable light. 
He, in contrast to the Fatimid caliph al-Zahir during 1024-1025, handed out 
charity to the pious and the poor and provided for 6,000 (estimates are 
between 6,000 and 12,000) people in Cairo. His example was followed by 
top officers of the army, high-ranking Muslim and Christian administrators 
and people of means who were concerned for their fellow men. The 
responsible conduct of the ruling elite deflected the worst consequences of 
the crisis, at least for a while.  
In 597/1200-1201, however, the terrible impact of the famine was 
fully felt. The sultan left Egypt with his army for Syria. In doing so the 
regime must have exhausted its grain surplus and had nothing to offer to 
the people. ʻAbd al-Latif al-Baghdadi describes in moving terms the plight 
of the helpless and claims that cannibalism was widespread. Imports of 
grain from Syria and Palestine (in October 1200) were not enough to have 
any real impact on the overall situation. The rise of the Nile on 3 September 
1201 was fifteen cubits and sixteen fingers but the water receded 
immediately. In practical terms it meant that the next harvest would also be 
insufficient. Referring to the situation in 1201-1202, ʻAbd al-Latif al-
Baghdadi makes the chilling remark that although the harvest was small the 
demand for grain was much reduced because of high mortality. During the 
period between July 1200 and November 1201, 111,000 deaths were 
recorded in Cairo.15 External sources – the letters of Geoffrey of Donjon, 
the master of the Hospitallers in Syria – clearly attest that the situation in 
1202 was gloomy. In a letter written in June 1202 to king Sancho VII of 
                                                     
15  For references to sources, see Y. Lev, ‘Saladin’s Economic Policies and the 
Economy of Ayyubid Egypt’ in: U. Vermeulen and K. DʼHulster eds., Egypt and 
Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras V (Leuven 2007) 207-249: 243-247. 




Navarra, Geoffrey makes an en passant remark on the ‘influx of beggars’, 
arriving from Egypt to Syria and Palestine because of the famine.16 
The famine of 1024-1025, which involved a single year crop failure, 
had only short term consequences and the recovery must have been 
immediate. The famine of 1200-1202, which involved a crop failure in two 
consecutive years, had far more devastating medium-range consequences. 
The demographic and economic recovery was slower and longer and must 
have taken two or three decades. 
 
 
The famine of 1264 
 
The famine of 1264 was, apparently, a result of the low rise of the Nile in 
August-September 1263. If this reconstruction of events is correct, it means 
that large purchases of grain in anticipation of a shortage in 663/1264-1265 
must have been taking place since the Summer of 1263 and, consequently, 
this famine can be labeled as a famine of ‘the current year’ type.  
The first disruption in the orderly functioning of the wheat and bread 
market took place at the beginning of Rabiʻ II 662/end of January-
beginning of February 1264 as the prices soared. The response of the sultan 
Baybars I to the crisis is described in detail by well-informed contemporary 
sources and was a mixture of both failed and highly effective policies. The 
first step of imposing maximum prices was misguided and brought the 
market to a standstill.  
The decree of maximum prices was swiftly rescinded and a policy of 
daily direct sales of wheat from the stocks of the regime to the poor and to 
widows was adopted. This policy was enhanced by registering the names of 
the poor in the capital and extended toward other social groups such as the 
blind, and the low-paid auxiliary military groups (Kurds and Turkmen), who 
found it difficult to cope with rising prices of bread. The responsibility for 
these policies was shared between the sultan, who provided for the blind; 
high-ranking military officers who had to provide for three months for 
specific groups of the poor; and the commander-in-chief of the army, who 
provided for the Kurds and Turkmen. In addition, wealthy people of the 
civilian society such as rich merchants and cadis also assumed responsibility 
                                                     
16 H.E. Mayer, ‘Two Unpublished Letters of the Syrian Earthquake of 1202’ in: S.A. 
Hanna ed., Medieval and Middle Eastern Studies in Honor of Aziz Suryal Atiya (Leiden 





by providing for the poor. The sultan understood very quickly the limits of 
governmental intervention in the markets mechanism and flooded the 
market with supplies aimed directly at the worst affected social groups. By 
committing the combined resources of the regime and the upper echelons 
of the military and civilian society the sultan staved off the potential dangers 
of the crisis and bought social peace.17 The conduct of the regime also 
offers a clue to the true nature of this crisis. Apparently, the rise of the Nile 
in the summer of 1263 was slightly below sixteen cubits and the regime felt 
secure enough that it wouldn’t be exposed to massive shortage in 1264, and 
had the necessary resources to flood the market with supplies. The light 
nature of the 1264 crisis doesn’t invalidate the effective handling of the 
situation by the regime.  
 
 
The wider context 
 
Under previous regimes the grain surpluses of Egypt were shipped to fed 
Rome and Constantinople. One would expect the Muslim rulers of Egypt to 
take care for providing the capital Fustat and later Fustat-Cairo, a task that 
seems feasible and straightforward. Medieval Islam, however, was not a 
direct heir of Late Antiquity, and urban institutions and life evolved 
differently. The historical origins of the clear distinction between the 
household grain economy of the regime and the grain market are not utterly 
clear and only some general suggestions can be offered at this stage. 
Following the Arab conquest of Egypt, during the seventh and early 
eight century, the old Roman-Byzantine system of requisition of surplus 
grain from Egypt’s peasants was continued and put into new uses. The 
Muslim rulers sent Egypt’s grain to the holy cities of Arabia, provided for 
the Arab-Muslim military in Fustat (the diwan system), and made a 
contribution to Umayyad fleets that raided the Mediterranean and to 
building projects in Damascus and Jerusalem.  
                                                     
17  Shafiʻ ibn ʻAli, Kitab Husn al-Manaqib al-Sirriyyah al-Muntazaʻah min Sirah al-
Zahariyyah [Eng. translation], ʻAbd al-ʻAziz al-Khuwaytir ed. (Riyadh 1976) 74; 
Muhyi al-Din ibn ʻAbd al-Zahir, ‘Al-Rawd al-Zahir fi Sirat al-Malik al-Zahir’ [Eng. 
translation]  S.F. Sadeque ed. and trans., Baybars I of Egypt (Dacca 1956) 94-95 
(original text) 204-206 (trans.).  
 




  Dispatching Egypt’s grain to Arabia evolved into a truly longue durée 
trend and medieval and Ottoman rulers of Egypt continued this policy at 
great cost and effort. Under the Mamluk sultans (thirteenth-fifteenth 
centuries), and later the Ottomans, this policy was increasingly maintained 
through the creation of vast pious endowments which, in some cases, also 
had ships for shipping the grain to Mecca and Medina.  
By the inner logic of the endowment system and its legal definition 
any act of endowment is a charity par excellence. Consequently, sultanic 
endowments of agricultural land for supplying the holy cities with grain 
were arrangements elevated from the realm of policy to the level of a sacred 
deed done in a quest for a reward in the afterlife that also epitomized the 
piety of the ruler and the expectations from him to be just and charitable. 
These endowments also tallied with the perception that a charity performed 
in a holy city is especially meritorious and beneficial for the salvation of the 
donor. Care for Mecca and Medina embodied Islamic piety, while providing 
for Cairo was just a matter of policy with no religious content. Although 
basically solid such an argument has its limitations, as the Ottomans 
invested great efforts in providing grain and bread for Istanbul. 
The apparent lack of institutionalized interest of medieval Muslim 
rulers of Egypt in how the population of Cairo obtained its bread might 
have been an unintended by-product of the abolishment of the diwan 
system in the Abbasid state by the caliph al-Muʻtasim during the late 830s. 
The abolishment of the system paved the way for the emergence of a 
commercial grain market as the main mechanism for the grain trade in 
Fustat and supplying bread for its population. However, with the 
establishment of the quasi-independent Tulunid (868-905) and Ikhshidid 
(935-969) dynasties in Egypt a powerful regime-sponsored household grain 
economy had emerged. This trend only intensified and became perpetuated 
under the Fatimid rule and the establishment of Cairo as the governmental 
center. 
